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EXCEPTIONALISM” THESIS
Summary: Although former Yugoslavia constituted what was widely held to
be the most “promising” communist country in terms of potentials for economic re-
formandpoliticaldemocratization,SerbiaremainedtheonlyEastEuropeancountry
in which the former communist elite managed to defeat its opponents in a series of
elections and preserve important elements of institutional and ideological continuity
with the old system. Moreover, its regime played a conspicuous role in Yugoslavia’s
violent collapse. In the specialist literature, the “Serbian exceptionalism” thesis has
been elaborated in a number of forms. These are critically reviewed in the first part
of the paper, classifying the paradigms according to whether they emphasize: 1) Ser-
bian traditionalist, authoritarian, and collectivist political culture, 2) the affinity be-
tween traditional Serbian national populism, Russophile anti-Westernism, and
communism, 3) the exclusivist and assimilationist character of Serbian nationalism,
or 4) the appeals of the contemporary Serbian political elite led by S. Miloševiæ. In
the second part of the paper an alternative explanation is presented that seeks to be
both interpretively adequate and causally plausible. It rests on five basic factors:
1) historical legacy (the distinctive character of the Serbian collective historical ex-
perience and the relationship between Serbian and Yugoslav identities); 2) institu-
tional analysis (the unintended consequences of communist federalism); 3) ideology
(the revival of narratives of “Serbian victimization” by Serbian intellectuals); 4)
leadership and social base (the peculiar nature of Miloševiæ’s appeals in the period
of the terminal crisis of communism); and 5) the role of the diaspora (the perceived
ethnic threat among Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia).
Key words: Serbia, exceptionalism, explanation, historical legacy, political
culture, tradition, political elites.
“...almostevery[Serbian]generationhaditsKosovo.Such
werethemigrationsoftheXVIIandXVIIIcenturies,theinsurrec-
tions and wars against the Turks in 1804, 1815, 1876, and 1912,
and the rejection of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in 1914; the
rejectionofthemilitarydefeatin1915andthecrossingofAlbania
by the Serbian army; the rejection of the Tripartite pact with Ger-
manyonMarch27,1941;theinsurrectionagainstfascismin1941,
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hundred Serbs for every German soldier; the rejection of Stalin’s
hegemony in 1948...”
Serbian Writer Dobrica Æosiæ, 1980
1
“TheprocessofmigrationofSerbsandMontenegrinsfrom
Kosovo under economic, political and simple physical pressure is
probably the last tragic exodus of a European population. The last
time such processions of desperate people were seen was in the
Middle Ages... But our goal is to overcome this state of hatred, in-
tolerance and mistrust. So that all people in Kosovo can live well.
And this is why the first thing I want to say to you, comrades, is
that you should stay here. This is your land, here are your houses,
fields and gardens, your memories. You are not going to leave
your land just because life has become difficult, because you are
suffering from injustice and humiliation. It was never in the spirit
of the Serbian and Montenegrin people to withdraw in the face of
difficulties, to demobilize when it should fight, to become demor-
alized when the situation is hard. You should stay here both be-
cause of your ancestors and your heirs. Otherwise, your ancestors
would be ashamed and your heirs disappointed.
Slobodan Miloševiæ, April 1987
2
Students of comparative democratic transition have paid little
attentiontothecaseofSerbia.Onereasonforthisliesinthesimplefact
that Serbia remained the only East European country in which the for-
mer communist elite managed to defeat its opponents in a series of
competitiveifnotentirelyfreeelections,andpreservesuchessentialel-
ements of institutional and ideological continuity with the old system
as the communist party’s control over the police, army, large state en-
terprises, and the most important mass media for more than a decade
after the fall of the Berlin wall. As one Serbian political scientist has
noted, this persistence of the “old regime” made Serbia different even
fromcasesinwhichtheformercommunistsreturnedtopower(Lithua-
nia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania), whether because the
former communist parties in these countries had transformed them-
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1 Dobrica Æosiæ, „Jedan pristup istorijskom romanu,” Stvarno i moguæe
(Ljubljana: Cankarjeva zalo ba, 1983), 143. This is the text of Æosiæ’s undelivered
1980 Oxford lecture on the historical novel.
2 Slobodan Miloševiæ, Godine raspleta (Beograd: BIGZ, 1989), 140-147.selves into socialist or social-democratic parties on the west European
pattern (Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania) or because they were forced
to spend a considerable time in the opposition (Bulgaria, Romania).
3
Perhaps even more important than these institutional continu-
ities was the conspicuous role of the Serbian regime in Yugoslavia’s
violent collapse. The brutal wars of Yugoslav succession accompa-
nied by mass violence against civilians, the destruction of cities, and
the repeated mass exoduses of refugees caused by successive waves
of ethnic cleansing, have rendered the Yugoslav case different even
from other cases of state disintegration (Soviet Union, Czechoslova-
kia),letalonefrominstancesofthemoreorlesssuccessfultransition
to democracy in ethnically more homogenous states (Hungary, Po-
land). Under these conditions, the overriding temptation was to treat
the Serbian and Yugoslav cases as unpleasant “anomalies” that need
to be explained away rather than explained.
There is much that is ironic about this “selective omission” of
Yugoslavia and Serbia from comparative studies of democratic tran-
sition. It is worthwhile recalling that Yugoslavia was for many de-
cades considered the communist country most likely to evolve in the
direction of democratization. Yugoslavia’s history of decentraliza-
tion and economic reform, its exposure to Western cultural influ-
ences, its growing tourist industry and private service sector, its
small-holding peasant class and urban socialist petty bourgeoisie in
possession of cars, country homes and foreign currency accounts,
and its techno-managerial elite that increasingly made decisions on
the basis of market criteria, were all factors that seemed to favor de-
mocratization. Aleading comparative political sociologist undoubt-
edly expressed the prevailing consensus in the mid-1970’s when he
singled out Yugoslavia as the most promising “post-totalitarian au-
thoritarian regime” in eastern Europe from the point of view of its
potentialforeconomicreformandtheinstitutionalizationof“limited
pluralism.”
4 As Susan Woodward has noted, even the political crisis
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3 Ognjen Pribiæeviæ, Vlast i opozicija u Srbiji (Beograd: B92, 1997), 13-14.
4 Juan Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Fred I.Greenstein
and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Massachusetts
and Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1975), III, 175-343. In
his classic overview of sub-types of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, Linz
(pp.345-346) places the Yugoslavia of the mid-1970’s in the category of “democra-
tizing and pluralistic authoritarianism,” i.e. a sub-type of an authoritarian regime inandeconomicdownturnofthe1980’swouldnothaveledonetopre-
dict the descent of Yugoslavia into political authoritarianism and
all-outcivilwar:“Ontheeveoftherevolutionsineasternandcentral
Europe, Yugoslavia was better poised than any other socialist coun-
try to make a successful transition to a market economy and to the
West...Evenafteradecadeofeconomichardshipandpoliticaluncer-
tainty in 1979-1989, the relative prosperity, freedom to travel and
work abroad, and landscape of multicultural pluralism and contrasts
that Yugoslavs enjoyed were the envy of eastern Europeans.”
5 Thus,
the theoretical and comparative interest of the Yugoslav and Serbian
casesliespreciselyinthefactthattheydefythestandardexpectation
of political modernization theory that higher levels of economic de-
velopment, industrialization, urbanization, literacy, and “cultural
Westernization” favor democratic outcomes.
6
How,thentoexplaintheYugoslavandSerbiananomalies?One
logical way to proceed is to look for factors that made Yugoslavia and
especially Serbia distinct from other east-European cases. Indeed,
many specialists on Yugoslavia and Serbia implicitly took this path
withtheresultthattheoriesofYugoslavandSerbian“exceptionalism”
have proliferated in the literature. Without entering into larger contro-
versies about the origins of the wars of Yugoslav succession, in what
follows I critically reexamine several different arguments about Ser-
bian “exceptionalism.” Next, I offer my own alternative explanation
of the non-democratic political outcome in Serbia. Finally, I conclude
with some thoughts on the implications of the legacy of the Miloševiæ
regime for the current democratic transformation.
II. The Case Against “Serbian Exceptionalism”
The first, and fairly standard argument about Serbian
exceptionalism that is often only implicitly made in the literature on
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whichtheinstitutionalizationofgroupinterestsiswelladvancedandinwhichfurther
democratization (at least on the local and/or factory level) seemed like an imminent
possibility.
5 Susan Wodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold
War (Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1995), 1.
6 Seymour Lipset, Political Man (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981, enlarged edition).Yugoslavia is that the economically more advanced as well as “cul-
turally Westernized” former Yugoslav republics—Slovenia and
Croatia—enjoyed better prospects for democratic transformation
than Serbia which, with the significant exception of its northern au-
tonomous province of Vojvodina, was somewhat below the Yugo-
slav average in terms of standard development indicators.
7 In other
words, since Serbian society was relatively deficient both in some
macro-sociological preconditions of democracy (urbanization, liter-
acy, the size of the middle class), and/or certain political-cultural at-
tributes (cultural proximity to the West), it is not surprising that it
more readily succumbed to the nationalist-authoritarian temptation
than its Slovene and (admittedly less so) Croat counterparts.
Asignificant elaboration of this argument is made when Ser-
bia’sfailedtransitionisattributednotonlytotheweaknessoftheso-
cial preconditions of democracy, but also to its traditionalist,
authoritarian, and collectivist political culture. A characteristic ex-
ample is provided by the American historian Nicholas Miller: “Five
years after the first free elections in postwar Serbia, the stated aim of
mostofitspoliticalactorsthereisstillatruetransitiontodemocracy.
The reason for this is simple. Although Serbia has the structures and
institutions necessary for democratic government, there is no demo-
cratic culture. Instead Slobodan Miloševiæ, has governed in an au-
thoritarianmannerinthenameoftheSerbiannation.”
8Althoughasa
historian Miller was sensitive to a number of contextual factors that
helpedaccountforthe“failedtransition”inSerbiasuchasthelegacy
ofinter-ethnicconflictandthedifficultiesfacedbytheSerbianoppo-
sitionintimeofwar,heplacedtheexplanatoryemphasison“thefail-
ure of Serbia’s intelligentsia to embrace a civic culture rooted in
respectfortheindividualasopposedtothenation”and“theinability
of the Serbian people to produce a coherent, anti-authoritarian,
anti-nationalist opposition to the Miloševiæ regime.” These failures
oftheSerbianintelligentsiaandtheSerbianpeople,inturn,reflected
“a collectivist political culture and the aftermath of forty-five years
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7 For the developmental differences between Yugoslav republics see Sabrina
Petra Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991 (Bloomington
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 136-176.
8 NicholasJ.Miller,“Afailedtransition:thecaseofSerbia,”inKarenDawisha
and Bruce Parrot, eds., Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East
Europe (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 146-189.of communism.”
9 Other scholars have seconded Miller’s argument,
whether by emphasizing the entrenched “patriarchal patriotism” of
the Serbian intelligentsia
10 or the deliberate destruction of cultural
alternatives to traditionalist völkisch authoritarianism by the
Miloševiæ regime.
11 Although such factors are often treated as back-
ground factors (necessary but not sufficient conditions) that, only in
conjunction with some other causes (e.g., lack of economic develop-
ment,theelitemanipulationofnationalism,thelegacyofethniccon-
flict) help explain the non-democratic political outcome, the clear
implicationisthatpolitical-culturalauthoritarianismwasentrenched
in Serbia in a way that was not true of the “Westernized” Yugoslav
republics or some east-central-European countries.
The Serbian political sociologist Slobodan Antoniæ has sub-
jected such arguments to careful empirical scrutiny, comparing the
social and political-cultural preconditions of democracy in Serbia
with those in neighboring East-European countries (Hungary, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria, Greece), former Yugoslav republics, as well as se-
lect Western countries.
12 Antoniæ’s conclusions are interesting, for
they go against the predominant stereotype in the literature about
Serbia’s relative social or political-cultural backwardness. Thus, a
reexamination of Lipset’s standard sociological preconditions of de-
mocracy (industrialization, urbanization, literacy), as well as eco-
nomic development levels measured by GDP per capita, yields the
result that Serbia had passed the standard sociological “threshold of
democracy” some time in the mid-1960’s, and did not significantly
differ, in this respect, from most neighboring countries (Romania,
Bulgaria, Greece).
13 While Serbia indeed possessed a larger rural
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9 Ibid.,146.
10 Lenard Cohen, Serpent in Bosom. The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Miloševiæ
(Boulder, Colorado: the Westview Press, 2001) combines an analysis of the instru-
mental manipulation of nationalism with an emphasis on the patriarchal and tradi-
tionalist elements of Serbian political culture.
11 Eric Gordy, The Culture of Power in Serbia. Nationalism and the Destruc-
tion of Alternatives (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,
1999) pays special attention to the cultural underpinnings of the regime.
12 Slobodan Antoniæ, “Društveni sklopovi, politièki delatnici, demokratski
poredak,” in Mladen Laziæ, ed. Raèji hod. Srbija u transformacijskim procesima
(Beograd: Filip Višnjiæ, 2000), 65-171.
13 Ibid., 69-75.population and smaller urban middle class (20% of the total popula-
tion) than some comparable non-communist countries (Greece with
36%), this did not make it Serbia significantly different from other
post-communist cases.
14 Similarly, Antoniæ’s quantitative histori-
cal-comparativeanalysisdemonstratesthatSerbiadidnotlagbehind
its neighbors in terms of the length its parliamentary tradition.
15
Finally, Antoniæ successfully challenges the argument about the
greaterthanaveragemassauthoritarianismoftheSerbianpopulation
asmeasuredbyAdorno’sclassic“authoritarianpersonality”scale.
16
Antoniæ’s quantitative assessment should be supplemented by
thefollowinghistoricalobservations:thattheadventofconstitutional
monarchy in Serbia (1903-1914) was the product of the autonomous
struggles of Serbian liberals and populists from the mid-nineteenth
century onwards;
17 that the Serbian liberal tradition proved its viabil-
ityduringtheinterwarYugoslavkingdom(1918-1941)whentheSer-
bian body politic exhibited a considerable degree of political
pluralism, measured by the number of political parties and their pro-
grammatic differences; that Serbian political parties and the Univer-
sityofBelgradewerecentersofoppositiontothedictatorshipofKing
Aleksandar (1929-1934) as well as the right-wing authoritarian gov-
ernment of Milan Stojadinoviæ (1935-1937);
18 and, finally, that the
appealoftheonlyseriousindigenousfascistgroupinthe1930’s—the
Zbor of Dimitrije Ljotiæ—was very weak (1% of the vote in the 1938
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14 Ibid., 77. It is well to remember that manual workers were the largest occu-
pationalgroupinalleasternEuropeancountriesandpost-Sovietrepublicsatthetime
of the fall of communism.
15 Ibid., 81-86. It should be pointed out that Antoniæ’s quantitative approach
included the construction of a composite “index of parliamentarism” on the basis of
the length of periods parliamentary, semi-parliamentary, quasi-authoritarian, and au-
thoritarian rule over the last 150 years in Greece, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria,
Croatia, and Serbia.
16 Ibid., 103-116.
17 For the evolution of the Serbian liberal and populist traditions see Gale
Stokes, Legitimacy through Liberalism. Vladimir Jovanovic and the Transformation
ofSerbianPolitics(SeattleandLondon:TheUniversityofWashingtonPress,1975);
Idem., Politics as Development. The Emergence of Political Parties in Nine-
teenth-Century Serbia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1990).
18 For the democratic traditions of the University of Belgrade see Ðorðe
Stankoviæ, Studenti i univerzitet, 1914-1954 (Beograd: Centar za savremenu istoriju
jugoistoène Evrope, 2000).election). In short, despite significant obstacles to liberalism in the
form of various authoritarian forces (the monarchy and the army), to-
talitarian ideologies (fascism), or the broader problem created by the
sociological discrepancy between formally democratic institutions
and an “inappropriate” social base (the peasant majority as opposed
to a sizeable middle class), liberalism occupied an important place in
the Serbian political tradition.
Nor did this liberal political tradition die out in the communist
period. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of WWII, the remnants of
Serbia’s democratic elites stood in the forefront of the liberal opposi-
tion to “the dictatorship of the proletariat.”
19 In the 1960’s Belgrade
Universityemergedastheintellectualcenterofneo-Marxistrevision-
ism and student radicalism, and subsequently of neo-liberal opposi-
tion to communist orthodoxy. As a result, by the early 1980’s
Belgrade was, together with Ljubljana, by far the liveliest opposition
centerintheformerYugoslavia.Notaccidentally,itwastheBelgrade
intelligentsia that formed the Committee for the Defense of Freedom
ofThoughtandExpression,petitioningcommunistauthoritiesforthe
release of prominent political prisoners regardless of nationality, the
introduction of the rule of law and political democracy.
20 It was this
liberal-civiccurrentoftheSerbianintelligentsiathatstoodinthefore-
front of repeated attempts to challenge and overthrow the Miloševic
regime throughout the 1990’s. If it is indeed true that significant na-
tionalist currents in the anti-communist Serbian opposition greatly
harmed the democratic cause by subordinating it to the cause of na-
tional unity and thus both directly and indirectly helped Miloševiæ
consolidate power in the late 1980’s, a significant logical jump is
made when these stances and actions are somehow deduced from
Serbia’s long-standing authoritarian tradition.
212
V
E
L
J
K
O
V
U
J
A
È
I
Æ
19 Vojislav Koštunica and Kosta Èavoški, Party Pluralism or Monism. Social
Movements and the Political System in Yugoslavia, 1944-1949 (New York: Colum-
bia University Press, 1985). Characteristically, this book was first published in Bel-
grade in 1983, i.e. at a time when liberal opposition to the communist monopoly on
political life in Serbia and Yugoslavia was reaching its peak.
20 The most important petitions and documents of the committee are reprinted
in Aleksa Ðilas, ed., Srpsko pitanje (Beograd: Politika, 1991), 255-288. The list of
those defended by the Committee included the future Bosnian President Alija
Izetbegoviæ, as well as Albanian political prisoners from Kosovo. In addition, select
committee members also defended the future Croat President Franjo Tudjman, and
the subsequent leader of the proto-fascist Croat Party of Right Dobroslav Paraga.If the authoritarianism thesis in its pure sociological form is not
convincing on either empirical or comparative grounds, another varia-
tion on the theme of “Serbian exceptionalism” might appear more per-
suasive. This thesis posits the existence of a special affinity between
traditional Serbian national populism, anti-Westernism, communism,
and the weakness of civic-democratic traditions in contemporary Ser-
bia. Much has been made of the Slavophile, orthodox Russophile, and
“anti-western” features of traditional Serbian national populism, and
the influence of pan-Slavic ideological currents on the world-view of
Serbia’s most prominent politician Nikola Pašiæ.
21 Others have a made
acaseforthecontinuitybetweenoldandnewformsofSerbiannational
populism.
22 It has been argued that these ideological elements were in-
dicativeofaformof“anti-modernism”thatsurvivedwellintothecom-
munist period, providing the cultural foundation of Serbia’s
contemporary “flight from modernization.”
23 Sometimes, the Russop-
hile ideological influences on Serbian national populism are taken as a
proof of the anti-liberal and exclusivist character of traditional reli-
gious-orthodox Serbian nationalism and contrasted with the more
“integrationist” and “Central-European” Slovene and Croat national
ideologies.
24 Afurther step is taken along the same path when the dis-
proportionate number of “Stalinist Russophiles” of Serbian and
Montenegrin origin in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) is
partially attributed to these traditional “orthodox-Slavophile” cultural
influences.
25 Finally, the relative overrepresentation of ethnic Serbs in
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21 For the original arguments about Pašiæ see Latinka Peroviæ, Srpsko-ruske
revolucionarne veze (Beograd,: Sluzbeni list SRJ, 1993); idem., Srpski socijalisti 19
veka. Prilog istoriji socijalistièke misli (Beograd,: Slu beni list SRJ, 1995); Andrei
L.Shemiakin, Ideologiia Nikoly Pashicha. Formirovanie i evolutsiia 1868-1891
(Moskva: Indrik, 1998).
22Nebojša Popov, Srpski populizam. Od marginalne do dominantne pojave,
Vreme, 35, May 24, 1993, 3-34 (special edition).
23 Latinka Peroviæ, “The Flight from Modernization,” in Nebojša Popov, ed., The
Road to War in Serbia. Trauma and Catharsis (Budapest: Central European University
Press, 2000), 109-123 as well as a number of contributions in Srbija u modernizacijskim
procesima XX veka (Beograd: Institut za noviju istoriju Srbije, 1994).
24 Ivo Banac, “Nationalism in Southeastern Europe,” in Charles A. Kupchan,
ed., Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1995), 107-122.
25 Ivo Banac, With Stalin against Tito. Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Com-
munism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988).key state institutions, from the communist party to the Yugoslav Peo-
ple’sArmy(JNA)andtheMinistryoftheInteriorinTito’sYugoslavia,
can be adduced as additional evidence of the strong association be-
tweencommunismandSerbia’sstatist-authoritarianpoliticalculture.
26
At first glance, this historical version of the political authori-
tarianism argument seems more credible than its pure “sociological”
counterpart. Indeed, during the 1980’s a significant transformation
of political discourse took place in Serbia with the interests of “the
people” increasingly replacing references to class in the speeches of
communistcadres,mostprominentlythoseofSlobodanMiloševiæ.
27
In populist fashion, this newly achieved “unity” between the leader
and the people was interpreted as a “higher form of democracy” that
transcendedthemundanewaysofWesternparliamentaryprocedure.
The revival Orthodoxy as the traditional symbol of Serbian nation-
hood, and the rise of a new “nativism” whose intellectual carriers
demonstrated a considerable ambivalence towards “Europe” and
“Europeanvalues,”werecomplementarypartsofthispoliticaltrans-
formation.
28 Nor is there much doubt about the fact that Yugoslav
communistsappealedtothestrongpro-Russianaswellaspro-Soviet
sentimentsofSerbianandMontenegrincommunistsduringWWII.
29
In the late 1980’s, some of main carriers of communist orthodoxy
such as Miloševiæ’s influential wife Mirjana Markoviæ and founder
ofthe“generals’party,”andtheheadoftheYugoslavPeople’sArmy
(JNA)VeljkoKadijeviæ,placedhighhopesonthepreservationofso-
cialism, if necessary with the help of the Soviet Union as a strategic
ally in the struggle against the “new world order” abroad and sepa-
ratists within.
30 Such “Russophile” sentiments gained a further foot-
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26 For the relative overrepresentation of Serbs and Montenegrins in party and
governmentelitesseeLenardCohen,TheSocialistPyramid.ElitesandPowerinYu-
goslavia (Oakville, New York, and London: Mosaic Press, 1989).
27 The official early collection of Miloševiæ’s speeches is Slobodan Miloševiæ,
Godineraspleta(Beograd:BIGZ,1989).Amorerecent,albeitpoorlyeditedcollection
byagroupofauthorsisOdGazimestanadoŠeveningena(Beograd:Harprom,2001).
28 See the contributions in Popov, The Road to War in Serbia.
29 MilovanÐilas,Wartime(NewYork:HartcourtBrace,1977),documentsthe
significance of Soviet- Russian sentiments for Yugoslav communists.
30 VeljkoKadijeviæ,Mojevidjenjeraspada(Beograd:Politika,1993).Seealso
the memoirs of the last president of Yugoslavia’s collective presidency Borisav
Joviæ, Poslednji dani SFRJ (Beograd, Politika: 1995).hold in Serbian society during the 1990’s when the disappointment
with the policies of Serbia’s old “Western allies” (United States,
England, and France) resulted in the revival of the old idea of Russia
as the only great power protector of the Balkan orthodox Slavs.
Despite these strengths, the historical version of the political
authoritarianism argument can be challenged on several grounds. To
beginwiththeobvious,whiletheSoviet-Russiansympathiesofmany
Serbian and Montenegrin communists in WWII are beyond doubt, it
is well to remember that for more than forty years after the 1948
Tito-Stalin break Yugoslav communists defined their political iden-
tity largely in opposition to the Soviet model. The fact that the Yugo-
slav population enjoyed higher standards of living as well as much
greater social and cultural freedoms than the “subject peoples” of the
Soviet bloc was understood as a proof of the superiority of Yugosla-
via’s “self-management socialism” not only among communists but
also among the Yugoslav population at large. In fact, for almost two
decades (approximately 1965-1985) Yugoslavia’s ideological dis-
tance from the Soviet bloc and cultural openness to the West was one
of the main informal sources of Yugoslav national pride as well as of
the legitimacy and stability of Tito’s communist regime.
The argument about the special association between commu-
nism and Serbian political culture can also be challenged. It is well
known, although rarely mentioned, that the early Partisan movement
was predominantly a Serbian phenomenon. As late as the end of
1943, 17 of 27 Partisan divisions were almost exclusively made up of
ethnic Serbs.
31 The causes of this Serbian attachment to communism,
however, had much less to do with the “Soviet-Russophile” mindset
of Serbian communists, and much more with the persecution of eth-
nic Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia (which included Bosnia
and Herzegovina). By contrast to his strong following among the
peasant refugee Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, Tito’s mass base in Ser-
bia remained weak until the very end of the war, with the bulk of the
peasantry supporting general Mihajloviæ’s monarchist Chetnik
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31 R. V. Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe (Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 107-130. See also Vojna enciklopedija
Jugoslavije(Beograd:Vojno-izdavaèkizavod,1971),vol.7,15-27,forthedatesoffor-
mation of various Partisan brigades. The brigades carried regional appellations so it is
fairly easy to identify their Serbian provenance. The exceptions to this rule were the
First and Second Proletarian Brigade largely populated by Serbs from Serbia.movement.
32 Nor was the popularity of communists much greater in
the immediate aftermath of the war when Serbs in Serbia voted
against the Communist sponsored National Front ticket in greater
numbers than Slovenes, Croats, or other ethnic Yugoslavs.
33 Not sur-
prisingly, in the aftermath of the war Yugoslav communists waged a
veritable ideological war against “greater Serbian nationalism.
34
Let us finally consider the argument that orthodox Serbian na-
tionalism was both more “exclusivist” and “assimilationist” and,
therefore, more intolerant than its integrationist “Central-European”
counterparts. The most articulate spokesman for this argument has
been the American historian Ivo Banac.
35 Correctly addressing our
attention to the fact that Miloševiæ’s ideological innovation consisted
in blending left orthodox-communist and right-wing nationalist mo-
tifs in a new and counter-intuitive fashion, Banac traces the elements
of this ideology back to Serbia’s nineteenth century “linguistic” na-
tionalismwhichtargetedbothCroatsandBosnianMoslemsascandi-
dates for assimilation and thereby created “the grounds for a
permanentconflictbetweentheSerbsandtheirWesternneighbors.”
36
However, “since assimilation and expansion ultimately could not
succeed in creating Serbs where they did not exist, Serbia’s vast em-
pire-building projects—first in independent Serbia (1878-1918) and
then in Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia—became the source of grow-
ing frustration, failure, and fear.”
37 One result of this failure was the
retreat of Serbian “integral nationalists” into a pan-Slavic Orthodox
exclusivism that “dulled the assimilationist tradition of the Serbian
national ideologies and eased the way for Nazi racism, particularly in
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32 For the Chetnik movement see Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1975).
33Burks, The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe, 127.
34 This was rooted in the interwar policies of Yugoslav communists. See Ivan
Avakumoviæ, The History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Aberdeen:
Aberdeen University Press, 1962). Amore recent treatment that extends to the post-
war period is Aleksa Ðilas, The Contested Country. Yugoslav Unity and Communist
Revolution, 1919-1953 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).
35 See, in particular, Ivo Banac, “Yugoslavia.The Fearful Assymetry of War,”
in Stephen R.Graubard, ed., Exit from Communism (New Brunswick and London:
Transaction Books, 1993), 141-174, in addition to idem., “Nationalism in Southeast-
ern Europe.”
36 “Nationalism in Southeastern Europe,” 115.
37“Yugoslavia.The Fearful Assymetry of War,” 144.regard to the Jews.”
38 Another manifestation of this exclusivism was
King Aleksandar’s dictatorship that represented “a variant of fascism
oftheEastBalkantype.”
39Finally,“Serbiansupremacy”wasinsured
even in communist Yugoslavia. Although communist victory cost
Serbiaitsmonarchy,resultedinthesuppressionofitsnationalinstitu-
tions (parliament, political parties, the Orthodox church), and offi-
cially equalized Serbia with the other Yugoslav republics, Banac
argues that Serbs were compensated for these losses by Tito’s deci-
sion “to dull the campaign against Serbian predominance through the
espousal of centralism and Yugoslav unitarism—the ruling political
and ideological antecedents that permitted the revival of Serbian in-
fluence.”
40 The clear implication of this argument is that both in its
assimilationist and exclusivist, “greater Serbian” and “unitarist” and
“centralist” Yugoslav forms, Serbian nationalism was “imperialist”
andunacceptabletootherYugoslavnationalities.Bycontrast,thede-
cidedly “ethnic” cast of Tudjman’s Croat nationalism is a historical
aberration insofar as it represents “a significant departure from the
statist emphasis that is more typical of Croat national ideologies.”
41
ThisisnottheplacetoenterintothecauldronofYugoslavhis-
torical controversies. Nevertheless, the empirical and conceptual
flaws of the “greater Serbian chauvinism” thesis deserve to be
pointed out if only because the argument has become so widespread
in the literature.
42 In the first place, it should be noted that the nine-
teenth-century project of Serbian unification could be called “impe-
rialist” only with a considerable stretch of the imagination. Even if
nineteenth-century Serbian national ideologists claimed Bosnia and
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38“Nationalism in Southeastern Europe,” 115.
39 Ibid.
40“Yugoslavia.The Fearful Assymetry of War,” 145.
41“Nationalism in Southeastern Europe,” 115.
42For some arguments to this effect see Rabia Alia and Lawrence Lifschultz,
eds., Why Bosnia? (Stony Creek, Connecticut: The Pamphleteers Press, Inc., 1993);
Bo e Èoviæ, ed., Roots of Serbian Agression (Zagreb: Centar za strane jezike, 1993);
Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia (London and New York: Verso Press,
1993); Noel Malcolm, Bosnia. A Short History (New York: New York University
Press, 1994), and idem., Kosovo. A Short History (New York: Harper Perennial,
1999); Thomas Cushman and Stjepan Meštroviæ, eds., This Time We Knew. Western
Response to the Genocide in Bosnia (New York and London: New York University
Press, 1996); Sabrina Petra Ramet, Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia
from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996).Herzegovina and parts of “historic Croatia” on linguistic and/or eth-
nicgrounds,itshouldbepointedoutthatthesewerenotterritoriesof
two independent states with a well-defined national consciousness,
but provinces of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires that contained
significant Serbian populations. Nor was there was anything “ideo-
logically aberrant” about these claims in the nineteenth century age
of nationalism. Indeed, such and similar claims were common to
most east European nationalisms (including Croat nationalism
which claimed all of Bosnia as a part of “historic Croatia”), the key
differencebeingthatSerbiabackedthemupwiththeforceofarmsin
the Balkan wars (1912-1913) and World War I. Finally, while Ser-
bia’s territorial acquisitions in the Balkan wars (Kosovo, Macedo-
nia)wereaccompaniedbyatrocitiesagainstciviliansandattemptsat
forcible assimilation (Macedonia), there is little evidence to suggest
that Serbian nationalism was any more violent than its other Balkan
counterparts.
43
It is indisputable that Serbian elites politically dominated the
interwar Yugoslav state and selectively used heavy-handed state co-
ercion against Croat, Macedonian, or Albanian “separatists.” This
useofstatecoercionprovokedtheresentmentofminoritiesaswellas
constitutivepeoplesofthestate(Croats)ininterwarYugoslavia.Yeta
significant conceptual leap is made when the traditional authoritarian
regime of King Aleksandar is labeled a “monarcho-fascist” dictator-
ship along the lines of interwar communist propaganda.
44 As far as
Serbia’s “pan-Slavic nationalists” (the Bishop Nikolaj Velimiroviæ)
and fascists (Dimitrije Ljotiæ) are concerned, their ideas were largely
right-wing Russian and/or European fascist imports with little
grounding in the mainstream tradition of peasant populism repre-
sented by Nikola Pašiæ and his Radical party.
45 Not accidentally, dur-
ing World War II right-wing collaborationists remained highly
unpopular in Serbian society, with the majority of Serbs giving their
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43 ForatrocitiesintheBalkanwarsseeTheOtherBalkanWars.A1913Carne-
gie Endowment Inquiry in Retrospect (Washington D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment,
1993).
44 ForamorebalancedconceptualtreatmentofBalkanandEast-CentralEuro-
pean authoritarianism and fascism see Andrew C. Janos, East Central Europe in the
Modern World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 125-218.
45 In passing, it should be noted that Bishop Nikolaj Velimiroviæ’s Pan-Slavic
“exclusivism” landed him in Dachau during World War Two.allegiance either to the monarchist Chetniks of general Mihajloviæ or
Tito’s communist partisans.
46 Nor was the persecution of Serbian
Jews accompanied by the kind of tacit approval that still plagues the
collective conscience of some East-European nations.
What, then, about Serbian “cultural assimilationism,” i.e. at-
tempts to “make Serbs” out of non-Serbs? Here, aside from the pe-
riod of integral Yugoslavism (1929-1934), when King Aleksandar
indeed attempted to eradicate the historic provinces (including Ser-
bia) in the name of Yugoslav unity, it is hard to find any period in
which Serbian political hegemony was accompanied by serious at-
tempts at doing away with distinct cultural traditions, let alone at
“forcefully assimilating” the Croats or even Bosnian Moslems (con-
sidered by many Serbian nationalists as “Serbs” of Islamic faith).
47
The only significant exception to this rule was Macedonia where the
indigenous Slavic-speaking population was considered an “unde-
fined ethnic mass” which could be linguistically assimilated.
48 By
contrast, Croat and Bosnian Moslem parties were largely successful
in protecting their cultural if not political-administrative space
throughout the interwar period.
Several observations are also in order about the relationship
between Serbian nationalism and Yugoslav “unitarism.” In the first
place, it should be noted that the strict “unitarist” interpretation of
the Yugoslav idea (the idea that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were
“three tribes” of the same “ethnic” nation) was challenged already in
the 1920’s, increasingly giving way to attempts at forging a “syn-
thetic” Yugoslav culture on the basis of the distinct traditions of the
“threeYugoslavtribes.”
49Aftertheperiodof“integralYugoslavism”
(1929-1934) Serbian political and intellectual elites moved towards
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46 A good guide to Serbia under occupation is Branko Petranoviæ, Srbija u
drugom svetskom ratu (Beograd: Vojna Štamparija, 1992).
47 For cultural policies in interwar Yugoslavia see Ljubodrag Dimiæ, Kulturna
politikauKraljeviniJugoslaviji1918-1941(Beograd,Stubovikulture,1996,3vols.).
48 For Serbian arguments about Macedonia see Dragoslav Jankoviæ, Srbija i
jugoslovensko pitanje 1914-1915 godine (Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju,
1973), 30-33.
49 Andrew Wachtel, Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation. Literature and Cul-
tural Politics in Yugoslavia (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998);
Branka Prpa-Jovanoviæ , Jugoslavija kao moderna dr ava u vidjenjima srpskih
intelektualaca, 1918-1929, Ph.D. dissertation, Belgrade University, 1995.theviewthatYugoslaviawasa“complexstate”madeupofthreedis-
tinct nations (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes). As a result, Serbian intellec-
tuals began reinterpreting the Yugoslav idea in increasingly “statist”
rather than “ethnic” terms.
50 In short, the evolution of Serbian ideas
about Yugoslav state and national identities was considerably more
complex than Banac cares to admit.
Finally, what kind of proof could be adduced to support the
ideaofthe“aggressiveness”of“imperial”Serbiannationalism?One
reliable indicator would be the relative number of Serbian victims in
twentieth-century wars as compared to the same proportion among
other Yugoslav nationalities. The figures for World War I speak for
themselves. The combined population loss figure for pre-1912 Ser-
bia(Serbia’sethnicheartlandwithoutKosovoandMacedonia)wasa
staggering eight hundred thousand out of less than three million.
Montenegro, many of whose inhabitants considered themselves
Serbs, lost another fifty thousand, and it can be safely assumed that
among the half a million victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Croatia many were Serbs as well.
51 Even if most civilian losses can
be attributed to the catastrophic typhus epidemic, it should be
pointed out that Serbia’s military losses alone were two and a half
times larger per capita than those of France.
52
Undoubtedly, the figures on World War II are much more sig-
nificantbecausethelegacyofinter-ethnicpersecutionandwarfareis
morerelevantforexplainingcurrentethnicconflicts.Heretheclaims
of Serbian nationalists that a million Serbs died at the hands of the
Croat fascist Ustaša must be considered a gross exaggeration. More
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50 For the evolution of the views of Serbian intellectuals towards the Yugoslav
state in the interwar period see Milisav Janiæijeviæ, Stvaralaèka inteligencija
medjuratne Jugoslavije (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1984). For the new
“statist”interpretationofYugoslavismseethe1939lectureofSerbia’sgreatesthisto-
rian Slobodan Jovanoviæ, “Jugoslovenstvo u prošlosti i buduænosti,” Sabrana Dela
Slobodana Jovanoviæa (Beograd: BIGZ, Srpska knji evna zadruga i Jugoslavija-
publik, 1991), vol.11, pp.567-575.
51 Jozo Tomasevich, Peasants, Politics, and Economic Change in Yugoslavia
(Stanford, California and London, England: Stanford and Oxford University Press,
1955),255.FornewerestimatesseeRadošLjušiæ,“Doseljavanja,iseljavanjaigubici
stanovništva u novovekovnoj Srbiji (1804-1918) in Seobe srpskog naroda od XIVdo
XIX veka (Beograd: Zavod za ud benike i nastavna sredstva, 1990), 77-99.
52 Stevan Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (New York and Washington: Praeger Pub-
lishers, 1971), 53, fn.conservative and realistic estimates demonstrate that Montenegrins
suffered the highest wartime losses (10,4% of the population), fol-
lowed by Serbs (6,9%), Bosnian Moslems (6.8%), and then Croats
(5,4%).
53 However, these overall percentages do not give the com-
plete picture as the majority of Serbian losses occurred on the terri-
tory of the Independent State of Croatia (16,3% in Croatia; 14,6% in
Bosnia).
54 According to a leading Croat demographer, when those
Serbs who died in combat and/or as “collaborationists” are taken out
ofthepicture,theethnicSerbsvictimsof“fascistterror”ontheterri-
tory of the Independent State of Croatia number 217,000, i.e. some-
where on the order of one fifth of Yugoslavia’s total wartime losses
(estimated at lying somewhere between 950,000 and little above one
million).
55 Here, apparently, the tradition of Croat “integrationism”
did little live up to its historical promise, as the ethnic violence un-
leashed against Serbian civilians assumed a grotesquely brutal char-
acter.Undoubtedly,significantatrocitieswerevisiteduponothersas
well, and especially on Bosnian Moslems by Serbian Chetnik
forces.
56 Nevertheless, it is obvious that “greater Serbian chauvin-
ism”washardlythesoleculpritinthestoryoftwentieth-centuryYu-
goslav ethnic victimization.
A final version of the “Serbian exceptionalism” argument
needs to be considered. This is the fairly widespread view that the
main responsibility for the non-democratic political outcome in Ser-
bia and Yugoslavia lies with the Serbian political elite led by
Slobodan Miloševiæ.
57 The most consistent social-scientific exposi-
221
F
I
L
O
Z
O
F
I
J
A
I
D
R
U
Š
T
V
O
X
X
I
53 Bogoljub Koèoviæ,  rtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji (London: Naše
delo,1985),110-111.SimilarfiguresarepresentedindependentlybytheCroatdemog-
rapherVladimir erjaviæ,OpsesijeokoJasenovcaiBleiburga(Zagreb:Globus,1992).
54 Koèoviæ,  rtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji, 111.
55  erjaviæ, Opsesije oko Jasenovca i Bleiburga, 71.
56 See Vladimir Dedijer i Antun Miletiæ, Genocid nad Muslimanima,
1941-1945 (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1990). By contrast, the mass liquidation of Slovene
“White Guardists” and Croat “fascists” as well as a much smaller number of Serbian
Chetniks in the Bleiburg massacres of 1945 cannot be considered to be ethnically
motivated in the same way, as these were carried out by Tito’s Partisans. Neverthe-
less, it should be pointed out that in Croat “martyrology” these are often seen as vic-
tims of “Serbo-Bolshevik” terror.
57 LauraSilberandAllanLittle,Yugoslavia.DeathofaNation(NewYork:TV
Books,Penguin,USA,1995)isprobablythemostwidelyreadjournalistaccountthat
squarely rests the blame on Miloševiæ’s shoulders for the Yugoslav civil war. Similartion of this argument is that by Vernon Gagnon.
58 According to
Gagnon, who places the Serbian case in the context of broader inter-
national relations theory, “violent conflict along ethnic lines is pro-
voked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where
ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity.”
59 The main motiva-
tion of elites for provoking conflict lies in their desire to protect their
domestic political power from challenger counter-elites. One way to
do so in a political environment that precludes the use of large-scale
force against domestic opponents is “to shift the focus of political de-
bate away from issues where ruling elites are most threatened—for
example, proposed changes in the structure of domestic economic or
political power—toward other issues, defined in cultural or ethnic
terms, that appeal to the interest of the majority in non-economic
terms.”Suchappealstothenationalinterest,inturn,dependonthese-
lective reactivation of “national traditions and mythologies” and the
invocation of powerful external threats that can result in placing “the
interestofthegroupabovetheinterestsofindividuals,”sothatethnic-
ity becomes “all that counts.” This can be best achieved through the
monopolization of political discourse through the mass media with
the goal of creating “the impression of continuity between past con-
flicts and current ones,” and ”turning ruling elites into “credible de-
fenders” of national identity.
60 Gagnon then proceeds to demonstrate
that the segment of the Serbian elite led by Miloševiæ consciously
pursued the strategy of the externalization of conflict in a successful
bid to defeat both the intra-party and anti-regime opposition.
Gagnon’s argument has the demonstrable advantage of rely-
ing not on contestable interpretations of Serbian political culture or
history, but on testable empirical propositions about the proximate
causesofcontemporaryconflicts.Moreover,thisargumentfairlyac-
curately captures the mobilizational strategy of the Serbian elite that
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but weaker accounts in the same vein are Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia. A History of Its
Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), and Dusko Doder and Louise Branson,
Miloševiæ. Portrait of a Tyrant (New York: The Free Press, 1999).
58 Vernon Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case
of Serbia,” in Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven
Miller, eds,. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict (Cambridge, MA and London, Eng-
land: 1996-97), 132-169.
59 Ibid., 134.
60 Ibid., 136-142.consisted of exacerbating ethnic tensions at those critical junctures
when it felt most threatened by counter-elite challengers. The vi-
cious cycle of ethnic mobilizations and counter-mobilizations that
was thus inaugurated gave many of the real ethnic conflicts that sub-
sequently erupted the character of “self-fulfilling prophecies” and
enabled the Serbian elite to rebuild legitimacy and retain power in
hostile international and challenging domestic political context.
Despite these strengths, however, Gagnon’s explanation must
be considered incomplete. Most importantly, this explanation does
not give us a clear sense of why the “Serbian question” emerged in
the context of a communist Yugoslavia in which Serbs were alleg-
edly the “dominant” group, and why elite appeals to Serbian nation-
alism were credible to the masses (unless the assumption is made
that “masses” are inherently gullible). Nor does the “instrumental
manipulation” of nationalism school of thought successfully capture
the complexity of Miloševiæ’s appeals to various social constituen-
ciesinthelatecommunistperiodortothe“statist-Yugoslav”inaddi-
tion to the “ethnic Serbian” sentiments of his followers.
The critical reexamination of various theories of Serbian
exceptionalism has revealed a number of weaknesses in them. In
what follows, therefore, I advance an alternative explanation that
rests on “five pillars:” the distinctive character of the Serbian collec-
tive historical experience and the relationship between Serbian and
Yugoslavidentities(historicallegacy);theunintendedconsequences
of communist federalism (institutional analysis); the revival of nar-
ratives of “Serbian victimization” by Serbian intellectuals (ideol-
ogy); the peculiar nature of Miloševiæ’s appeals in the period of the
terminal political-economic crisis of communism (leadership and
social base); finally, the perceived ethnic threat among Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia (the role of the diaspora). Only such a multi-fac-
torial approach can result in an interpretively adequate and causally
plausible explanation of “Serbian exceptionalism.”
III. The Case for “Serbian Exceptionalism”
Obviously, of all the above-mentioned factors, “historical leg-
acy” is the one most difficult to “operationalize.” Not only does any
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Ination’s collective historical experience consist of multiple “layers;”
in addition, these “layers” are subject to selective interpretation by
political and intellectual elites who choose to emphasize those as-
pects of national past that best suit their material and “ideal” (value)
interests at any given point in time. Thus, in the case of Serbia of the
late 1980’s and 1990’s, some political actors chose to emphasize the
heroic heritage of the Partisan revolution (the generals’ party,
Miloševiæ),whileothersappealedtothemonarchist-Chetnikheritage
(the center-right opposition leader Vuk Draškoviæ as well as the ex-
treme right of Vojislav Šešelj), with a third group still attempting to
revive Serbia’s liberal-parliamentary tradition (the Democratic Party
led by Zoran Djindjiæ and the Democratic Party of Serbia led by
Vojislav Koštunica).
61 Any argument about historical legacy, there-
fore, must isolate some assumptions about the national experience
that are shared by most political actors and intellectual elites across
time or at least made explicit at some critical juncture in the nation’s
history. Fortunately, in the case of Serbia, we have one such critical
juncture in the nation’s development that is completely independent
of wartime massacres, the effects of communist nationality policy, or
the Miloševiæ period: this is the 1939 Serb-Croat Agreement.
The 1939 Serb-Croat Agreement resulted in the creation of a
large autonomous Croat unit in the previously unitary Yugoslav
state. This concession to Croat national sentiment was seen as a nec-
essary step in the resolution of long-standing Serb-Croat tensions.
62
From the Serbian national point of view, however, the agreement
proved problematic on three counts: first, the new Croat unit incor-
porated a large number of ethnic Serbs whose collective rights were
not guaranteed; secondly, the agreement incorporated into the Croat
unit a significant part of Bosnia and Herzegovina traditionally cov-
eted by Serbian nationalists; thirdly, it was unclear whether Croat
leaders understood the new federal unit as a prospective Croat na-
tionalhomelandorasanintegralpartoftheYugoslavstate.Reacting
to these problematic aspects of the Agreement, Serbian intellectuals
articulated their ideas about the relationship between Serbian and
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61 ForagoodoverviewofthesedifferentappealsseeRobertThomas,ThePol-
itics of Serbia in the 1990’s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
62 The best work on the Agreement is Ljubo Boban, Sporazum Cvetkoviæ-
-Maèek (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1965).Yugoslav identities, Serb-Croat relations, and the Serbian historical
experience more explicitly than at any time in the nation’s history.
These ideas were recorded in the journal of the newly formed Ser-
bian Cultural Club,
63 Srpski glas (the Serbian Voice). It deserves to
be pointed out that a number of these intellectuals not only partici-
pated in the movements for Serbian and Yugoslav unification, but
also wrote important histories of Bosnia, Serbia, and Yugoslavia:
such was the case with historians Vladimir Æoroviæ, Slobodan
Jovanoviæ, Dragoslav Stranjakoviæ, and Vaso Èubriloviæ. In other
words, the opinions of this cultural elite were well rooted in the Ser-
bian and Yugoslav past and can be considered representative of Ser-
bian national thought.
Fromthestandpointofhistoricallegaciesthreethemesvoiced
by these intellectuals stand out in particular: 1) concern with Serbian
national unity, and the boundaries of the prospective Serbian federal
unit; 2) the self-conception of Serbs as a state-building people; 3)
SerbiansacrificesforthecommonYugoslavstateandtheSerbs’spe-
cial historical mission in its creation and preservation.
ArepresentativesampleonthefirstthemeisofferedbyVladi-
mir Æoroviæ’s exposition of the inconsistencies of the Agreement.
AccordingtoÆoroviæ,whiletheCroatsideclaimedsomedistrictson
the basis of their Catholic (i.e. mostly Croat) majorities, it claimed
others on the basis of Croat “historic right” or arguments about geo-
graphiccontiguity.Inotherinstances,theCroatsidedeliberatelydis-
regarded the existence of Orthodox (i.e. Serbian) majorities in
districts attached to the Croat unit (Knin, Ravni kotari, Vrgin Most),
whileclaimingotherareas(intheNeretvavalley)onethnicgrounds.
Such inconsistencies could be forgiven, argued Æoroviæ, if the ques-
tion was one of drawing “administrative boundaries” in a common
Yugoslav state. However, “it is clear and obvious that this is not just
an administrative division, but a pure tribal [ethnic] division. On the
Croat side, in any case, it was never doubted that this was the bound-
ary of a national territory and a national state. Naturally, in such a di-
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63 TheSerbianCulturalClubwasformedinJanuary1937asabroadorganiza-
tionofindependentintellectualsandindustrialistsdevotedtoexaminingproblemsof
Serbian national culture in non-partisan fashion and with the aim of fostering an en-
lightened Serbian patriotism. See Ljubodrag Dimiæ, Kulturna politika u Kraljevini
Jugoslaviji 1918-1941, vol. I, 506-511 et passim.vision Serbs cannot remain indifferent to the outcome.”
64 Because
theethnicallymixedcharacterofmanydistrictspreventedaclearde-
marcationalongethniclines,continuedÆoroviæ,theprincipleofjus-
tice demanded that the number of co-nationals left out of their
respective units be equal on the Serbian and Croat sides. As it was,
however, the number of Serbs in the new Croat unit was twice the
number of Catholics (not all of them Croats) in the rest of Yugosla-
via. A final reason for concern, concluded Æoroviæ, was the openly
expressed view of Croat leaders that the agreement marked just “a
phase” in the national struggle. Since the meaning of this “phase”
was hardly unclear, Serbs could not be reproached for demanding
more unity “in Serbian ranks.”
65
Many contributors to Srpski glas seconded Æoroviæ’s argu-
ments, whether by pointing to the large number of Serbs inside the
Croat unit or demanding that majority Serbian districts in Croatia,
Slavonia, Bosnia, and Dalmatia be given the right to freely decide to
which federal unit they should be attached.
66 Others went much fur-
ther, openly claiming the Bosnian Moslems for the Serbian nation
and most if not all of Bosnia and Hercegovina for the prospective
Serbian federal unit,
67 debunking the “myth” of a separate Macedo-
nian nation, and asserting the “Serbian” character of Dubrovnik and
Dalmatia, despite the latter’s solid Catholic majorities.
68 Still others
argued that Serbia was “wherever there are Serbs,” including Kor-
dun, Lika, and parts of Dalmatia and Slavonia–all territories within
the new Croat unit. These lands were “Serbian,” asserted one author,
because “the ancestors of today’s Serbs successfully defended them
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64 Vladimir Æoroviæ, “Pitanje dr avnog preuredjenja,” Srpski glas, November
23, 1939, in Miodrag Jovièiæ, Jako srpstvo-jaka Jugoslavija. Izbor èlanaka iz
“Srpskog glasa” organa Srpskog kulturnog kluba, 1939-1940 (Beograd: Nauèna
knjiga,1991),18-19.AllsubsequentreferencestoarticlesfromSrpskiglasaretothis
edition.
65 Ibid., 19.
66 “Srpska jedinica,” January 25, 1939, ibid., 103-104; “Sporazum ili
nesporazum,” February 1, 1940, ibid., 105-106.
67 “Jugoslovenski karakter srpsko-hrvatskih pokrajina” and “Èija je Bosna,”
November 23, 1939, ibid., 20-22, 28-29; “Bajramski prilog hrvatskog dnevnika,”
November 30, 1939, ibid., 40-42.
68 For Macedonia see “Ju na Srbija ili Makedonija,” November 16, 1939,
11-12; for Dubrovnik and Dalmatia see “Problem Dubrovnika,” February 29, 1939,
134-138, and “Naša Dalmacija,” April 4, 1940, 166-172.from foreign occupiers in the course of centuries, soaking them with
their noble sweat and blood. Is not this right of possession sanctified
bybloodspilledinthepastandconfirmedbythestrengthandefforts
of those living in the present worth more than pacts and historic
rights?! The same is true for Serbian Vojvodina and Serbian
Bosnia.”
69 The clear implication of these arguments was that Serbs
had the right to their own federal unit that included most if not all
SerbslivinginYugoslavia,or,iftheYugoslavstateweretodissolve,
the right to self-determination in all districts in which they consti-
tuted majorities regardless of “historic” borders.
The other two prominent themes that figured prominently on
the pages of Srpski glas concerned the overall significance of the na-
tional state in Serbian history and the Serbs’ heroic role in the cre-
ation of the common Yugoslav state. Thus, Slobodan Draškoviæ
argued that to neglect the interests of the Yugoslav state would con-
stitute a betrayal of the Serbian state-building tradition: “The best
Serbian tradition is: the state above all. Simply because without
one’sownnational statethereisnofreedom, noculture, noprogress,
no life... For Serbs life is worth living only in our own free national
state, in which we ourselves are masters of our fate... The whole his-
tory of the Serbs can be understood only if this is kept in mind.”
70
Similarly,DragoslavStranjakoviæemphasizedthecolossalpricethat
Serbs had paid for their two independent states–Serbia and Monte-
negro. These sacrifices were the main reason why the Serbs “always
separated the regime from the state. The regime will come and go,
but the state must be preserved. A Serb will fight against a regime
which he dislikes, but will always take care not to undermine state
authority and state integrity.”
71
Others contributors advanced the argument that Serbs had
sacrificed the most for the common Yugoslav state as well. As one
editorialputit,“itisanindisputablefactthattheSerbsborethegreat-
est sacrifices, and had given most for it [Yugoslavia]. What makes
them [Serbs] different from others is the devoted participation of all
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69 M.M., “Gde god je Srba–tu je Srbija,” December 14, 1939, ibid., 57-58.
70 Slobodan Draškoviæ, “Današanji polo aj i zadaci Srba,” February 29, 1940,
ibid.,pp.124-128.Seealso,bythesameauthor“Zloupotrebesrpskogimena,”March
21, 1940, ibid., pp.156-158.
71 Dragoslav Stranjakoviæ, “Hrvati i Sporazum od 26.avgusta 1939.godine,”
December 28, 1939, ibid., pp.90-94.popular strata in the construction of the new state, whereas in the
case of others only a select stratum of patriotic sons took part in this
task. This is why in the soul of every Serb, whether peasant or citi-
zen, amateur or intellectual, Yugoslavia is a matter of the deepest
feelings, the supreme law of his activity...Never mind how different
it might appear from time to time, Yugoslavia is more dear to the
Serbs than even their narrower national feelings. All his [the Serb’s]
sacrifices were made for Yugoslavia, and he will not refrain from
them today if the interests of Yugoslavia so demand. The only con-
cession he asks for is the guarantee that these sacrifices will truly
serve the cause of strengthening it.”
72 For this reason, whoever sins
againstSerbdomcouldbeforgiven,buttheonewho“sinsagainstthe
state is our mortal enemy with whom we engage in open combat.”
73
Likewise, Slobodan Draškoviæ emphasized that “all Serbs from the
first to the last will fight for Yugoslavia today just as they had for
Serbia in 1912, 1913, and 1914-1918. Everyone knows this well:
Serbs, and Croats, and Slovenes, as well as minorities and foreign-
ers, friendly or unfriendly.”
74
Enough has been said to reveal the relevance of these argu-
mentsforexplainingcontemporarypoliticaloutcomes.Theideathat
the Yugoslav state was the best guarantor of Serbian national unity,
and that, short of that, Serbs would have the right to collective
self-determination in all districts in which they constituted majori-
ties regardless of the existing “historic” or administrative borders
made a dramatic reappearance in the late 1980’s. At that time, the
right to self-determination of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia was seen
as overriding those constitutional interpretations that viewed the Yu-
goslav republics as the main loci of self-determination regardless of
their ethnic composition.
75
The contemporary relevance of the other two themes—the
Serbs’self-conception as a “heroic” people and the special place oc-
cupied by the state in Serbian history—is more difficult to demon-
strate. Nevertheless, several observations can be made to illustrate
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72 “Dr ava pre svega,” February 8, 1940, ibid., 114-116.
73Ibid., p.115.
74 “U Srbiji nema mesta Srbovanju,” May 16, 1940., ibid., 194-197.
75 Robert Hayden, “Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Re-
publics,” Slavic Review, 51, 4, Winter 1992, 654-674.importantpolitical-culturalcontinuities.Inthefirstplace,itiswellto
remember that, unlike their Russian Bolshevik counterparts, Yugo-
slav communists waged their revolution in the context of Nazi occu-
pation.
76 Notwithstanding the continued communist campaign
against “greater Serbian chauvinism,” and Tito’s attempts to mobi-
lize minorities, the Partisans disproportionately relied on ethnic
Serbs and Montenegrins during the first two years of the war. There
is little doubt that this successful mobilization had much to do with
the long-standing Serbian and Montenegrin tradition of resistance to
foreign rule.
77
Heroic resistance against overwhelming odds was, in any
case, an integral part the Kosovo myth as the defining national myth
of the Serbs.
78 By appropriating this myth of heroic resistance for
theirownpurposes,thecommunistsestablishedalatentlinkbetween
Serbian history and the Partisan movement, and made the postwar
Yugoslav communist state a legitimate object of Serbian self-identi-
fication. This process of reidentification with the communist state
was eased by the repulsion caused by Chetnik atrocities, and the
delegitimation of the monarchy as the traditional symbol of Serbian
statehood.
79 The superimposition of the Partisan experience upon
traditional Serbian national identity was confirmed by two Western
anthropologists in the conclusion of their twenty-year study of a
postwar Serbian village: “To be a Serb is implicitly to be Orthodox,
explicitly to celebrate the slava and importantly to associate oneself
withaheroictraditionofstruggle.HerethecovertlinkingofthePar-
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76 Inthisrespect,theYugoslavrevolutionwasmoresimilartotheChineserev-
olutionthantheRussianprototype.SeeChalmersJohnson,PeasantNationalismand
Communist Power. The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Stanford:
StanfordUniversityPress,1962).JohnsonincludestheYugoslavcasebywayofsec-
ondary comparison.
77 Milovan Ðilas, Wartime, gives a good sense of how this tradition of resis-
tance helped the Partisans recruit among Serbs and Montenegrins.
78 The Kosovo myth cannot be discussed here at length. For a good overview
seeThomasA.Emmert,SerbianGolgothaKosovo,1389(NewYork:ColumbiaUni-
versity Press, 1990), and the collection of essays in Wayne S. Vucinich and Thomas
A. Emmert, eds. Kosovo. Legacy of a Medieval Battle (Minneapolis, Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press, 1991).
79 See, in this respect, the excellent contribution by Audrey Helfant Budding,
“Yugoslavs into Serbs: Serbian National Identity, 1961-1971,” Nationalities Papers,
25, 3, 1997, 405-426.tisan struggle against the Germans with earlier struggles against the
Turks and later as a nation-state against the Austrians and the Ger-
mans is of great significance.”
80 This, and not “Russophilism,” con-
stitutes the true link between communism, Serbian national identity,
and the Yugoslav state.
The second factor that needs to be taken into account in ex-
plaining “Serbian exceptionalism” concerns the unintended conse-
quences of communist nationality policy. The main features of this
policyareknown:forusthekeyquestionconcernstheuniquewaysin
which it affected Serbs and Serbia in Yugoslavia. In this respect, the
most important departure of Yugoslav from Soviet-style federalism
was the extension of federalism to Serbia. This “federalization” of
Serbia was meant to underscore the fact that, in contrast to the Soviet
case in which Soviet-Russian nationalism acquired the character of a
full-blown state ideology, Serbs and Serbia would be equalized with
theothernationalitiesbothontheideologicalorinstitutionallevels.
81
The reemergence of the Serbian national question almost
forty years after the war, however, was largely a consequence of this
“equalization,” and especially of early communist decisions about
the boundaries between different federal units.
82 As Walker Connor
correctly observed, “Yugoslavia is unique among Marxist-Leninist
states in offering an illustration of gerrymandering as a means of
weakeningthestate’slargestethnicelement.”
83InthecaseofSerbia,
this “gerrymandering” involved decisions intended to dilute the nu-
merical preponderance of Serbs in post-war Yugoslavia. The first
one of these decisions involved the creation of two autonomous re-
gions within Serbia, Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina.
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80 Joel M. Halpern and Barbara Kerensky Halpern, A Serbian Village in His-
torical Perspective (New York: Irvington Publishers, Inc., 1984), 123. The slava is a
SerbianOrthodoxfamilyholidayincelebrationofaChristiansaintwhoservesasthe
protector of the household. The custom serves as the defining marker of Serbian or-
thodoxy.
81For a detailed contrast between the Russian and Serbian cases see Veljko
Vujaèiæ “Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization and Political Outcomes in Rus-
sia and Serbia: AWeberian View,” Theory and Society, 25, December 1996:763-801.
82 The following section is based on Veljko Vujaèiæ “Institutional Origins of
Contemporary Serbian Nationalism,” East European Constitutional Review, 5, 4:
51-61, fall 1996.
83 Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and
Strategy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 333.The creation of the autonomous region of Kosovo-Metohija
was motivated by the necessity of incorporating the non-Slavic Al-
banian minority into the new state. As Albanians accounted for 65%
oftheregion’spopulationin1948,suchadecisionseemedlogicalon
ethnic grounds. Yet, as a Serbian liberal observer noted many years
later, in a unified Serbia without autonomies, Albanians would have
accounted for only 8,15% of the population, a minority by the stan-
dards of any state.
84 As Kosovo was also the historical cradle of Ser-
bian medieval culture of great symbolic significance in the national
mind, its “separation” from Serbia laid the foundations for a lasting
Serbian grievance. Even more problematic from the “Serbian na-
tional point of view” was the creation of autonomous Vojvodina
which,intheaftermathofthelargeGermanexodus,containedanar-
row Serbian majority of 50,58% (1948), with Hungarians constitut-
ing 25,78% of the region’s population. In contrast to Kosovo,
however, Vojvodina’s autonomy was justified on historical grounds,
but this left unclear why other “historical” regions of the Yugoslav
state (Istria, Dalmatia) were not accorded the same status.
One consequence of the creation of autonomous units in Ser-
bia was that more than a million Serbs were left outside of the bor-
ders of the “Serbia proper” (i.e. without the autonomous regions),
whichamountedtomorethanthecombinedethnicstrengthofallmi-
norities in the Serbian republic as a whole. Moreover, the borders of
Serbia without the autonomous regions were roughly equal to the
boundaries of pre-1912 Serbia, i.e. Serbia from before the Balkan
wars. It is hardly surprising that many years later, when the autono-
mous regions practically gained the status of republics, and the party
committees of Vojvodina and Kosovo began coordinating their poli-
cies against Serbia, many Serbian nationalists concluded that Tito
had deliberately “divided Serbia.”
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a traditional point of
contention between Serb and Croat nationalists since the mid-nine-
teenthcentury,wasmorecomplicatedasitscreationcouldbeseenas
aninstanceofgerrymanderingagainstbothSerbiaandCroatia.Asin
1948 Serbs constituted 44% of the region’s population, and Croats
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84 By comparison, Albanians constituted 17,12% of the population of the re-
public of Macedonia, but no provision was made for their autonomy. Kosta Èavoški,
“Jugoslavija i srpsko pitanje,” in Aleksa Ðjilas, ed., Srpsko pitanje, 95-117.19%, while Bosnian Moslems were not recognized as a separate na-
tionality until the late 1960’s, Bosnia and Herzegovina was a repub-
lic without a clear titular nationality in the sense prescribed and
imagined in Soviet-style federalism. The creation of autonomous re-
gions for Serbs and Croats (compactly settled in Western
Herzegovina)wasthelogicalsolutiononthebasisoftheethnicprin-
ciple. Instead, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina was established as
a republic on the basis of its separate cultural-historical identity and
withintheboundariesconfirmedbythegreatpowersintheTreatyof
Berlin (1878).
Another problematic decision, from the Serbian national
point of view, was the absence of an autonomous Serbian region in
Croatia on those territories in which Serbs constituted relative ma-
jorities,andinwhichtheyhadbeenexposedtowartimemassacres.
85
If one reason for the establishment of autonomies within Serbia was
the protection of minorities from the potential tyranny of the titular
nationality,anevenstrongercasecouldbemadeforSerbsinCroatia,
whose wartime record of persecution and resistance presumably
qualifiedthemforbettertreatmentthantheoneaccordedthe“collab-
orationist” Hungarian and Albanian minorities. In any case, there
also existed a historical precedent for such autonomy in the former
Habsburg Military Frontier. Proposals for the creation of a Serbian
autonomous unit in Croatia surfaced during the war, but were dis-
carded by the communist leadership for reasons not entirely clear to
this day.
86
AfinalpotentialreasonforSerbiandissatisfactionwastherec-
ognition of Montenegrins as a separate nationality. While
Montenegro possessed a separate state existence throughout the nine-
teenth century, as well as a numerically small, but vocal separatist
movement in inter-war Yugoslavia, the majority of Montenegrins
consideredthemselvesclosetoSerbsinethnicterms,andplansforthe
unification of Serbia and Montenegro predated World War I. Indeed,
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85 It must be pointed out, however, the Serb-Croat border in the Srem
(Vojvodina) was resolved to Serbian advantage and also that there was no corre-
spondingautonomousregionforCroatsinVojvodina.Ontheotherhand,Croatscon-
stituted only 2,6% of the population of Serbia, while Serbs made up 14,47% of the
population of Croatia.
86 Paul Shoup, Yugoslav Communism and the National Question (New York
and London: Columbia University Press, 1968), 112-113.strong pro-Serbian sentiments in Montenegro were much in evidence
during World War II, as manifested in the failure of Italian-sponsored
Montenegrin separatism, as well as the participation of a large num-
berofMontenegrinsinboththeChetnikandPartisanmovements.De-
spitethis,Montenegrinswererecognizedasadistinctnationality,and
Montenegro was established as a separate republic.
Theinstitutionalarrangementsofcommunistfederalismwere
in line with the ideological campaigns of Yugoslav communists
against “greater Serbian chauvinism.” Many decades later, the simi-
larities between post-war Communist solution to the national ques-
tion and the pre-war constitutional proposals of some Croat
politicians would provide the foundations for a Serbian version of
the “stab-in-the-back legend.” In reality, early Yugoslav federalism
washardlyimaginedasgenuinefederalism,norwerethebordersbe-
tween Yugoslav republics thought of as boundaries between inde-
pendent states. As late as 1971, the year of the adoption of
constitutional amendments that effectively turned Yugoslavia into a
party-dominated confederation of republics and autonomous re-
gions,Titostated:“Wedonotlookupontheindependence andstate-
hood of the republics in the classical sense. Having decided to
overcomefederalstatismwedidnotstrive,nordowestrivetocreate
polycentric statism...”
87
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the institutional weak-
ening of Serbia was compensated for by the centralist organization of
the party-state and ethnic Serbian over-representation in party and
government structures. Thus, in 1971, Serbs and Montenegrins (43%
of the population) constituted 70% of all officials in the Yugoslav
Ministry for Internal Affairs. However these overall figures hide the
fact that it was Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia, rather than Serbs from
Serbia who were over-represented: thus, 63% of all Serbian officials
in the Ministry of Internal Affairs were Serbs from Bosnia and
Croatia.
88 The relative over-representation of the Serbs from Croatia
and Bosnia is also evident from figures on the ethnic distribution of
elite positions in party and government structures in these republics.
Thus, in 1971 Serbs in Croatia accounted for 14,2% of the total popu-
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87 Quoted in Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and
Strategy, 226.
88 Ibid., 298-299.lation,butoccupied21%ofleadingpostsintherepublicanpartyorga-
nization,and21,5%ofthoseingovernmentandlegislativestructures.
Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs accounted for 37,3% of
the population, but comprised 47,4% of leading Party personnel, and
43.3% in government and legislative bodies.
89 In addition, ethnic
Serbs also made up the majority of Yugoslav army officers.
90
These Serbian “advantages,” however, became less relevant
after the passing of the 1974 constitution that de facto transformed
Yugoslavia into a party-dominated confederation.
91 If the introduc-
tion of “parity” (not “proportional”) representation according to a
“republican key” that favored titular nationalities diluted the numeri-
cal preponderance of Serbs in federal institutions, the extension of
equal status to the republics and autonomous provinces (“one repub-
liconevote”)furtherunderscoredtheanomalouspositionofSerbiain
the federation. As Walker Connor has noted: “Equal status in effect
gave each republic/province 12,5 percent representation, resulting in
a gross underrepresentation for a people (the Serbs) accounting at the
time for 40 percent of the population. Moreover, a representative
from Serbia proper could not speak for the 42 percent of all Serbs liv-
ing in Kosovo, Vojvodina, or one of the other republics.
92
The third factor that needs to be taken into account in explain-
ing “Serbian exceptionalism” concerns the reactions of Serbian intel-
lectuals to these developments. Already in 1968, the writer Dobrica
Æosiæ, until then a leading regime intellectual of the Partisan genera-
tion, attacked the indifference of the provincial party committee of
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89 For these figures see Leonard Cohen, The Socialist Pyramid, 297-334.
90 According to one account, ethnic Serbs accounted for 60.5% of the officer
corps in 1972 (Serbs made up 41.7% of the total population), and Montenegrins for
another8%(3%ofthetotalpopulation).IncomparisonCroats(23%ofthetotalpop-
ulation) made up only 14% of the officer corps. However, there was more „ethnic
equality“ in the High Command in which Serbs were under-represented (33%) and
Croats over-represented (38%), a clear sign of the regime’s commitment to equaliza-
tion at the highest command levels. It should be noted, however, that the High Com-
mand sample is small. James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military. The Yugoslav Crisis
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 54.
91 For the devolution of authority from the federal center see Steven L. Burg,
ConflictandCohesioninSocialistYugoslavia.PoliticalDecision-Makingsince1966
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983).
92 Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy,
336.Kosovo to manifestations of Albanian nationalism and warned of the
possibly tragic consequences of the emigration of Serbs from the re-
gion.
93 Only three years later, in 1971, when constitutional amend-
ments granted broader powers to the autonomous provinces within
Serbia,MihailoÐuriæ,aprofessorattheBelgradeFacultyofLaw,ar-
gued that the Yugoslavia was already little more than a “geographic
entity.” If the constitution was followed to the letter and the radical
decentralizationofstatepowerproceededapace,continuedÐuriæ,the
Serbian national question would be opened for the first time since
World War II. This was because the borders of the Socialist Republic
of Serbia were neither “national” nor “historic,” as evidenced by the
factthatabout40percentofSerbsfoundthemselvesoutsideoftheju-
risdictionoftheSerbianrepublic:thiswasalmostequaltothenumber
of all Croats or, alternatively, to the number of all Slovenes, Bosnian
Moslems, and Macedonians combined.
94
The true national radicalization of the Serbian intelligentsia,
however, occurred more than a decade and a half later, when Alba-
nian riots in Kosovo and the inability of party and government struc-
turestohaltthecontinuedexodusofSerbsfromtheregion,raisedthe
specter of the final loss of this symbolic heartland of the nation.
95
This Serbian “national revival” took a variety of forms, from histori-
cal tracts attacking Titoism from both democratic and nationalist
points of view, the rehabilitation of the Chetnik record in World War
II,callsfortherecentralizationofthefederationonanewdemocratic
foundation, and repeated attacks on party policies in Kosovo.
96
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93 Æosiæ’s speech to the Central Committee of Serbia is reproduced in Dobrica
Æosiæ, Stvarno i moguæe, 27-40.
94Anali pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 3, May-June 1971: 230-233. It should
bepointedoutthatDjuriæ’sunorthodoxdiscussionofthe1971constitutionalamend-
mentsearnedhimatwo-yearprisonsentence(subsequentlycommutedtooneyear).
95 Between 1961 and 1981 the proportion of Serbs and Montenegrins in the
population of Kosovo dropped from 27% to 15%. By, the time of Miloševiæ’s rise to
power (1987) it was little more than 10%. The 1981 Yugoslav census listed 110,000
Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo living in other parts of Yugoslavia. By 1987,
anadditional25-30,000hadlefttheprovince.ThefiguresarefromMichelRoux,Les
Albanais en Yougoslavie: Minorité nationale, territoire et developpement (Paris:
Editions de la Maison de Sciences de l’Homme, 1992).
96 For a good overview of Serbian intellectual dissent in this period see
Aleksandar Pavkoviæ, “Intellectual Dissidence and the Serb National Question,” in
Aleksandar Pavkoviæ, Halyna Koscharsky, and Adam Czarnota, Nationalism andEven more consequential was the emergence of narratives of
ethnic victimization in the works of Serbian writers. In his epic
tetralogy Vreme smrti (A Time of Death) Dobrica Æosiæ portrayed
Serbia’s colossal tragedy in World War I, restoring to respectability
“reactionary”SerbianpoliticianslikeNikolaPašiæandthelegendary
militarycommander ivojin MišiæwholedSerbianarmiestovictory
against overwhelming odds. In his subsequent novel Grešnik (The
Sinner), Æosiæ tried to demonstrate how internationalist Serbian
communists destroyed the fruits of victory by waging a merciless
struggle against “greater Serbian chauvinism under Comintern in-
structions.”
97Otherauthorssecondedthesethemesandrevivedother
aspects of the national past. Thus, in his widely read Knjiga o
Milutinu (The Book about Milutin) Danko Popoviæ portrayed the
tragic plight of a Serbian peasant in the first half of the century and
implicitly advocated abandoning “Yugoslav illusions.”
98 Finally, in
No (TheKnife),VukDraškoviæaddressedthehithertotabootopicof
the genocide of Serbs in the Independent State of Croatia.
99
Many of these themes found their way into the Memorandum
of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, a draft document leaked to the
press in September 1986, that was widely understood as a new na-
tional program.
100 Without going into the broader aspects of the
Memorandum that have been analyzed elsewhere,
101 the main
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Postcommunism (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995), 121-139; idem., “The Serb National
Idea: A Revival, 1986-1992” Slavonic and East European Review, 72, 3, July 1994:
440-455. For the democratic critique of Titoism see the already mentioned Vojislav
Koštunica and Kosta Èavoški, Party Pluralism or Monism; for the rehabilitation of
the Chetnik heritage see Veselin Djuretiæ, Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna vlada
(Beograd: Balkanološki institut, 1985, 2 vols.).
97 Dobrica Æosiæ, Vreme smrti (Beograd: Prosveta, 1972-1979); Grešnik
(Beograd: BIGZ, 1985).
98 Danko Popoviæ, Kniga o Milutinu (Beograd: Knji evne novine, 1986).
99 Vuk Draškoviæ, No (Beograd: Zapis, 1982).
100Memorandum srpske akademije nauka i umetnosti (Beograd: Duga, June
1989). In reality, while the Memorandum did express Serbian national grievances in
cryptic form, it was not as influential as is widely believed.
101For this broader context and a balanced assessment of the Memorandum’s
significance see Audrey Helfant Budding, “Systemic Crisis and National Mobiliza-
tion: The Case of the ‘Memorandum of the Serbian Academy’,” in Zvi Gitelman et.
al., Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe: Essays in Honor of Roman
Szporluk (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2000), 49-69.Serbian grievances voiced there can be presented schematically as
follows: 1) After 1925, under Comintern instructions, the Commu-
nist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) explicitly supported secessionist
movements and advocated the breakup of Yugoslavia; 2) Even
though the CPY later reversed these anti-Yugoslav and anti-Serbian
policies, its leader Tito (a Croat) and main ideologist Kardelj (a Slo-
vene), exhibited a consistent anti-Serbian bias; 3) Postwar economic
policies favored Slovenia and Croatia at the expense of Serbia,
which was forced to support undeveloped regions and simulta-
neously sell its natural resources to developed ones at subsidized
prices; 4) As a result of the 1974 constitution, Serbs were dismem-
bered as a nation, with Serbs in Croatia exposed to “cultural assimi-
lation” and in Kosovo to “physical, political, cultural, and legal
genocide.”SummarizingtheseSerbiangrievances,theauthorsofthe
Memorandum concluded: “It is first and foremost a question of the
Serbian people and its state. The nation that had achieved statehood
after a prolonged and bloody struggle, had created a parliamentary
democracyonitsown,andwhichinthelasttwowarslost2,5million
compatriots, is the only one which has been deprived of its own state
by a party committee after four decades in the new Yugoslavia. A
worse historical defeat in peacetime can hardly be imagined.”
102
The fourth factor that needs to be taken into account in ex-
plaining “Serbian exceptionalism” is leadership. By 1986, the Ser-
bian nomenklatura found itself facing several political challenges: 1)
the growing pressure restoring constitutional control over the autono-
mous provinces, especially Kosovo; 2) the ideological challenge of
“Serbian liberalism and nationalism;” 3) the challenge of economic re-
form combined with latent aspirations for social justice; 4) the resis-
tance of republican and provincial elites with a vested interest in
decentralization. It was to these challenges that Slobodan Miloševiæ
found a most peculiar response.
Miloševiæ,asiswellknown,madehisfirstbigbreakthroughin
April 1987, when he addressed the grievances of Kosovo Serbs in a
completely novel fashion.
103 Unlike his predecessor Ivan Stamboliæ
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102Memorandum, 38-39.
103ThefollowingsectionislargelybasedonVeljkoVujaèiæ“SerbianNational-
ism, Slobodan Miloševiæ and the Origins of the Yugoslav War,” The Harriman Re-
view, December 1995, 25-34.who tried to reintegrate Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia through
party channels by employing standard Titoist rhetoric,
104 Miloševiæ
appealed to the traditional “heroism of Serbs and Montenegrins” and
called on them to “mobilize” in the “face of injustice and humilia-
tion” (see the introductory quote to this paper). Despite his repeated
emphasis on Titoist ideals, brotherhood and unity, and the continuity
of the revolution, this appeal to Serbian and Montenegrin heroism,
and “land, memories, ancestors,” was highly non-traditional for a
Serbian communist. Moreover, at a time when institutional gridlock
was paralyzing the fragile federation and other communist leaders
spokeinthefrozenlanguageofahalf-deadideology,Miloševiæ’sap-
peal to the people over the heads of party officialdom struck a com-
pletelyfreshchord.ItisnoexaggerationtosaythatMiloševiæ’sApril
1987 Kosovo Polje speech almost instantly turned him into a “charis-
matic hero” in the classic, Weberian sense of that term.
ThenatureofMiloševiæ’s“charismaticinnovation,”however,
has been misunderstood by those who reduce his appeal to “Serbian
nationalism” pure and simple. In fact, Miloševiæ pursued a
two-pronged ideological course, promising the preservation of Yu-
goslavia and socialism to party officialdom and army officers, and
Serbia’s reunification and social justice to the “masses.” This ideo-
logical course had its organizational counterpart in Miloševiæ’s si-
multaneous mobilization of the “party base” (the ouster of the
Stamboliæ faction in September 1987) and his sponsorship of Ser-
bia’s“streetrevolution”frombelow.During1988,thenewlyformed
“Committee for the Defense of Kosovo Serbs” rapidly developed
into a parallel structure of power that proved instrumental in depos-
ing the corrupt communist leaderships in Vojvodina (October 1988)
and Montenegro (January 1989), and breaking the constitutional
deadlock that stood in the way of Serbia’s “unification.”
105
Even a cursory glance at the major slogans of the “rallies of
solidarity with Kosovo Serbs” that shook Serbia and Vojvodina in
summer 1988, reveals the complexity of Miloševiæ’s appeals: here
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104 IvanStamboliæ,RaspraveoSRSrbiji:1979-1987(Zagreb:Globus,1988).
105In October 1988, one hundred thousand people, led by the organizers of the
Committee for the Defense of Kosovo Serbs, surrounded the building of the provin-
cial party committee of Vojvodina, forcing the resignation of the whole leadership.
The same scenario was repeated in January 1989 in Montenegro.extreme nationalism, populist adoration for the leader, frustrated as-
pirations for social justice and reform, and nostalgia for the glorious
days of Yugoslavism were all mixed in new and unpredictable
forms.Thus,callsforrevenge(“outwithimmigrantsfromAlbania;”
“we will hang Vllasi”—the Albanian communist leader) went hand
in hand with Yugoslavist slogans (“we don’t want civil war;” “down
with nationalists”); celebration of the leader (“Slobodan our hero,
Serbia will die for you”) along with anti-communist sentiments and
demandsforsocialjustice(“CentralCommittee,aren’tyouashamed
to hear the people crying”; “down with the red bourgeoisie”).
106
At the same time as he pursued “class war” in party commit-
tees and the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” in the street, Miloševiæ
made his first overtures to the Serbian Academy of Sciences and the
Serbian intelligentsia. Suddenly, books deemed reactionary only a
fewyearsearliercouldbepublished,withformerclassenemiesfrom
the “bourgeois right” transformed into les amis du peuple. Nor was
the technical intelligentsia with meritocratic aspirations left out: for
them Miloševiæ had promises of economic reform. In this fashion,
Miloševiæattemptedtosatisfythelatentaspirationsofhis“articulate
audiences” for political participation without turning them into po-
tentially threatening “publics.”
107
Miloševiæ’s simultaneous appeal to very different constituen-
cies (not just “nationalism”) was key to his political success: Yugo-
slavia, unity, and Titoism for the party orthodox and army officers;
SerbiaforthenationalistsandstatesupportfortheKosovoSerbs;re-
formandrehabilitationfortheintellectuals,socialjusticeandprotec-
tion for state-dependent workers and pensioners. It would be wrong,
however, to interpret these appeals to different audiences as an indi-
cation of the mere “opportunism” of a “colorless apparatchik.”
108
If we are to follow Ken Jowitt’s lead, charismatic leaders typically
reconcile ideological elements and latent political dispositions that
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106Despite its “revolutionary bias,” excellent empirical material on the rallies
inVojvodinacanbefoundinSavaKerèov,JovoRadoš,andAleksandarRaiæ,Mitinzi
u Vojvodini 1988 godine (Novi Sad: Dnevnik, 1990).
107For the distinction between “articulate audiences” and “publics” in the con-
text of late communism see Ken Jowitt, The New World Disorder (Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1992).
108AleksaÐilas,“SlobodanMiloševiæ:AProfile,”ForeignAffairs,72,3,Summer
1993:81-96,stressesMiloševiæ’sopportunismbutdoeslittletoexplainhismassappeal.previously were perceived as mutually incompatible.
109 The secret
of charismatic innovation consists precisely in the creation of a
new Gestalt that refashions the familiar in unpredictable ways, help-
ing bridge the gap between mutually incompatible or even antago-
nistic political constituencies.
When analyzed from this point of view, Miloševiæ appears as
the conciliator of the “greater Serbian” aspirations of Serbian national-
ists and the Yugoslav orientations of army officers, party officials, and
others; of technocratic aspirations for economic reform and workers’
aspirations of social justice; and, finally, as an orthodox communist
who violated traditional norms of party behavior by giving free rein to
mass activity and thereby satisfied the aspirations for political partici-
pation of an audience disgusted with the ineffectiveness of institutions
without giving it true representation. By engaging in such appeals,
Miloševiæ found an ingenious solution to the central institutional di-
lemma of communist parties in the period of “neo-traditionalist” cor-
ruption and decay: the absence of a credible “combat task” that could
provide the cadres with a sense of mission and the party with a novel
foundationoflegitimacyinanincreasinglythreateningenvironment.
110
The “Miloševiæ solution” to this problem was anticipated long
ago by Ken Jowitt when he noted that one way for communist parties
to offer their “articulate audiences” a sense of political membership
without giving up political monopoly was to “proliferate eth-
no-national combat tasks,” elevate the army to the status of a new col-
lective heroic agent, and substitute “the national unity of elite and
citizens” for the political equality between them.
111 Miloševiæ fits the
bill almost to perfection: his political language overflowed with terms
like “mobilization,” “battle,” “heroism,” “differentiation” (“purges”
in Yugoslav communist jargon), and “unity.”
112 The pervasiveness of
thesecombatmetaphorsconveyedbothMiloševiæ’strue“Leninistde-
termination” in the class struggle and his strong charismatic prefer-
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109Jowitt, The New World Disorder, 1-50.
110For the idea of the “combat task” as an institutional requirement of commu-
nist parties see Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon (New York: The Free
Press, 1960).
111Jowitt,TheNewWorldDisorder,155.Jowitt,itshouldbenoted,waswriting
about the Soviet Union in the 1980’s.
112 An excellent early analysis of Miloševiæ’s “combat rhetoric” is Kosta
Èavoški, Slobodan protiv slobode (Beograd: Dosije, 1991).ence for non-routine crisis politics at the expense of institutionalized
procedure.“Unity” on the other hand, was a term that served as a sub-
stitute for political participation and citizenship: thus, there was “the
unity of all communists,” “the unity of all the citizens and working
people of Serbia,” “the unity of all progressive socialist forces in Yu-
goslavia,” and even “the unified Yugoslav market” as the necessary
precondition for economic reform. In all these different forms of
“unity” virtually everyone—Serbs and Yugoslavs, communists and
non-communists, the party and the people, workers, peasants, and the
“honest intelligentsia,” proponents of the central plan as well as mar-
ket reformers—could find their place. Underlying all these forms of
“unity,” however” was the quintessential “unity of the leadership and
the people” which served as a functional substitute for citizenship.
Nothing conveys the ambivalence, complexity, and populist
character of Miloševiæ’s appeals better than his speech on the
six-hundredth anniversary of Kosovo battle (June 29, 1989), an event
thatmarkedthepeakofhis“charisma.”AdmonishingSerbstoremem-
ber the main values bequeathed to them by the legacy of the Kosovo
battle—values such as “unity,” “courage,” and “heroism,” Miloševiæ
proceededtostate:“Today,sixcenturieslater,weareonceagaininbat-
tles, and facing battles. They are not armed battles, although the possi-
bilityofthosecannotbeexcluded.But,regardlessofwhattheyarelike,
battles cannot be won without determination, courage, self-sacrifice.
Without those good traits that were present on the Kosovo field a long
time ago. Our main battle today is for the realization of economic, po-
litical,cultural,andgeneralsocialprosperity.Forafasterandmoresuc-
cessful catching up with a civilization in which people will live in the
twenty-first century. For this battle we need courage. To be sure of a
somewhat different kind.”
113 Miloševiæ concluded his speech by
underscoring that in Kosovo Serbs not only defended themselves, but
all of Europe as well. For this reason, all accusations of Serbia’s
“anti-Europeanism” were unfounded: Serbia was always in Europe
and would remain so, but “on its own terms, with dignity.”
Duringnexttwoyears,Miloševiæskillfullytailored“theparty
line”tothe“objectiveneedsofthemoment,”alwaysleavingtheulti-
mate question unanswered: whether he was more for reform or for
socialism, more for Europe or for heroism. But to those who could
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113For Miloševiæ’s Kosovo battle speech see NIN, July 2, 1989.perceive the overall trend with any degree of clarity, it was clear that
“combat” and “heroism” would prevail, especially once credible do-
mestic challengers appeared on the scene demanding free elections
and full citizenship.
114
All this “combat rhetoric”, however, might have been insuffi-
cient to prevent the final decay of the party-state in Serbia in the ab-
sence of the fifth factor that helps account for “Serbian excep-
tionalism:” the threat posed to Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia by the
prospect of Yugoslav state disintegration. Even if Miloševiæ was the
first one to begin stirring Serbs in Croatia, the triumph of Franjo
Tudjman’s nationalist Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) in the elections
of April 1990 must be seen as a turning point in the national radicaliza-
tion of this prospective Serbian “diaspora.”
115 Not only were Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia, as we have seen, the collective victims of “fascist
terror” in the Independent State of Croatia during World War II; by
1990, “the symbolic revival of genocide” was already well under way,
116 with Tudjman’s intolerant posturing giving the ethnic threat a real
resonance, and forcing an identity choice on Serbs in Croatia. As one
early political organizer of the Serbs in Croatia explained: “So long as
Yugoslavia’s federal structure was employed, we didn’t raise questions
about national consciousness and national institutions. We considered
Yugoslaviatobeourstate,andtherepublicboundariesasonlyadminis-
trative. That’s why we considered our nationality to be Yugoslav. But
now that there are fewer and fewer Yugoslavs and more Croats,
Slovenians, Serbs, Albanians, and so on, we realized that we Serbs in
Croatia need to return to our own national identity. In this context,
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114For Miloševiæ’s preference for “direct democracy” and aversion to parlia-
mentary pluralism see his interview to Le Monde, July 12, 1989. Translated in NIN,
July 16, 1989.
115An excellent analysis of the Serbian diaspora question is Susan L. Wood-
ward, “Diaspora or the Dangers of Disunification? Putting the ‘Serbian Model’into
Perspective,” in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The New European Diasporas. National
Minorities and Conflict in Eastern Europe (New York: Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, 2000), 159-214.
116 Bette Denitch, “Dismembering Yugoslavia: nationalist ideologies and the
symbolic revival of genocide,” American Ethnologist, 21, 2, 1994:367-390; Robert
M.Hayden,“Recountingthedead.Therediscoveryandredefinitionofwartimemas-
sacres in late and post-communist Yugoslavia,” in Rubie S. Watson, ed., Memory,
History, and Opposition (Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research
Press, 1994), 167-185.where we are confronted with real dangers and existential fears, it is
normal to unite in the framework of the national idea and to use that
principle to defend ourselves. If I am attacked as a Jovan and as a Serb,
it is only as a Serb that I can defend myself.”
117
ForSerbiancommunistsfromCroatiaandBosniawho,onac-
count of their strong wartime record, were disproportionately repre-
sented in the Yugoslav army and republican regime structures, this
identity-choice had a strong political dimension as well: Tudjman
wasnotonlyaCroatnationalistbutalsoananti-communistwhowas
threateningthefoundationsofthatTitoistYugoslaviawhichtheyhad
fought for, and which Miloševiæ ostensibly still was defending. The
boundaries between the “class” and “national” enemy were especi-
ally unclear to those Titoist army officers whose “revolutionary Yu-
goslav”self-identificationremainedstronguntiltheveryend.
118 The
importance of this national and political identity crisis of Yugoslav
army officers of Serbian background cannot be underestimated: at a
critical point of Yugoslavia’s path to war they felt threatened both as
communist Yugoslavs and as Serbs, and both threats decisively
pushed them into Miloševiæ’s political camp.
Conclusion
In this paper I advanced what I hope is an interpretively ade-
quate and causally plausible explanation of the non-democratic politi-
caloutcomeinSerbiaofthelate1980’sandearly1990’s.Intheprocess,
I critically reexamined several theories of “Serbian exceptionalism” in
thespecialistliteratureonSerbiaandYugoslavia,pointingouttheinad-
equacy of some one-sided or stereotypical views of Yugoslav history,
Serbian society, and Serbian nationalism in their historical develop-
ment. My goal was to contribute to a more adequate understanding of
the advent of a Serbian regime that was responsible for much of the
tragedy that befell the former Yugoslavia, not to absolve it from its
share of responsibility for that tragedy. Neither the advent of that re-
gimenorthesubsequenttragedythatensued,Itriedtodemonstrate,can
be understood on the basis of one-sided or “reductionist” explanations
of the “Miloševiæ phenomenon,” i.e. without taking into account some
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117Denitch, “Dismembering Yugoslavia,” 377.
118See the already mentioned memoirs of the last head of the Yugoslav army,
Veljko Kadijeviæ, Moje vidjenje raspada (Beograd: Politika, 1993).long-term factors, such as the special place occupied by the Yugoslav
stateinSerbiannationalconsciousness,thelegacyofethnicpersecution
in World War II, the unintended consequences of communist national-
itypolicythatledtothereemergenceoftheSerbiannationalquestionin
the 1980’s, as well the dramatic identity dilemma faced by Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia in the critical phase of Yugoslavia’s denouement.
Only this peculiar constellation of political-cultural, institutional, ideo-
logical, leadership, and “diaspora” factors can help explain “Serbian
exeptionalism,” i.e. the conditions that allowed the party-state to sur-
vive in the face of a remarkably hostile international environment and
considerableinternalopposition.Thus,thewillingnessofalargepartof
Serbian society to put up with a non-democratic regime for a consider-
able period of time was not only a consequence of Miloševiæ residual if
steadily declining charismatic status, his successful monopolization of
the media, the repeated invocation of credible ethnic threats which the
regime did much to produce, or the “siege mentality” caused by inter-
nationalsanctions,butalsohastobeunderstoodagainstthebackground
ofalong-termpolitical-culturalfactoranalyzedabove—thespecialpla-
ce of the independent national state in Serbian history, the real and per-
ceived collective sacrifices that went into its creation, and the mythol-
ogy of Serbian “heroism” in the struggle against overwhelming odds.
The failure to appreciate the importance of such factors has had
not only unwelcome theoretical, but also dire practical and political
consequences. Thus, much of the early Yugoslav policy of the interna-
tional community could be said to have rested on a false analogy be-
tween the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—two states that indeed had
much in common, from the legacy of indigenous communist revolu-
tions to ethno-territorial federalism and the internationalist ideology of
the “friendship of peoples.” However, in contrast to the “Soviet idea,”
the “Yugoslav idea” was neither communist nor “imperial” in any
recognizablesenseofthatterm.Itisinconsequence,therefore,thatun-
likemanyRussianswhocametoviewtheSovietstateasthepathologi-
cal superstructure of a totalitarian regime that stood in the way of
Russia’sownculturalrevivalandnationalstatehood,
119mostSerbssaw
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119 See especially Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Rebuilding Russia (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1991) but also Boris Yeltsin, The Struggle for Russia
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993?). Both Solzhenitsyn and Yeltsin, however differ-
ently, portray Russia as a victim of the empire.Yugoslavia as “their” (but not only theirs) national state. When this is
takenintoaccount,itwas“logical”toexpectthatSerbiawouldattempt
to hold on to remnants of the Yugoslav state or create an enlarged Ser-
bian national state by incorporating territories inhabited by its
co-nationals in the neighboring republics (i.e. Croatia and Bosnia).
This raises the counter-factual question of whether my account
does not place too much emphasis on “the burden of history” as op-
posedtoconcretepoliticalactors,andofwhethermyexplanationis,in
this sense, “over-determined.” To this it might be responded that his-
toricalfactorscannotandshouldnotbesacrificedtothetheoreticalel-
egance of social-scientific explanation if one can demonstrate their
explanatorysignificance;and,secondly,thatwhileitcanplausiblyhy-
pothesized that a less “combat-oriented” and less destructive Serbian
leader than Miloševiæ might have found the way to national compro-
mise, the full “confederalization” of the Yugoslav polity along the
lines suggested by Slovenia and Croatia would have required “heroic
self-restraint”onthepartofademocraticSerbianleader,aswellasfull
international guarantees (including military ones) to the Serbs in
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Once the war broke out, how-
ever, the vicious cycle of ethnic victimization gave the process of Yu-
goslav dissolution an irreversible character, and made the prospects of
democracy in Serbia unlikely in the short run. That significant seg-
ments of Serbian society continued to challenge the Miloševiæ regime
through mass demonstrations (1991, 1992, 1996-1997), electoral
competition (1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1998, 2000), as well as through
the independent mass media under the extremely adverse circum-
stances of war, international sanctions, and the internal police state,
shouldbeseenassignoftheresilienceofproto-democraticforces,not
as a sign of the “pathological weakness” of Serbian civil society.
But the development of that civil society and Serbian democ-
racyisstilltakingplaceintheshadowofwar.Itisnoexaggerationto
say that Serbia’s defeat in the successive wars of Yugoslav succes-
sion has been total — military, political, economic, and moral. In a
mere thirteen years, Serbia has lost most of the territories it had as-
pired to since the formation of the national state in the nineteenth
century and that were incorporated into the Yugoslav state 1918:
these include Krajina and Western Bosnia that were lost to the Croat
offensiveofAugust1995,andKosovoafter1999.Moreover,theun-
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andHerzegovinaformedasaresultofthe1995Daytonaccords),and
thestillincompleteprocessofYugoslavdissolution(witnessthecur-
renttensionsbetweenSerbiaandMontenegro),meansthatevenafter
ten years of war the Serbian national question has not been conclu-
sively resolved. To these real losses should be added symbolic
ones—theignominiousdeathoftheYugoslavideaandthedishonor-
able record of ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Serbia’s “transition
todemocracy,”therefore,isstill“exceptional”inthesenseoftheex-
ceptionally difficult legacy faced by the new democratic regime.
Veljko Vujaèiæ
RAZMATRANJE TEZE O „SRPSKOJ IZUZETNOSTI“
Apstrakt: Iako se pre 1990. smatralo da bivša Jugoslavija meðu svim komu-
nistièkim zemljama ima najbolje potencijale za ekonomsku reformu i politièku demo-
kratizaciju, Srbija je ostala jedina istoènoevropska zemlja u kojoj je nekadašnjoj
komunistièkoj eliti pošlo za rukom da porazi svoje protivnike u nekoliko uzastopnih
izbornih nadmetanja i da oèuva znaèajne elemente institucionalnog i ideološkog konti-
nuiteta sa starim sistemom. Štaviše, taj je re im igrao krupnu ulogu u nasilnom raspadu
SFRJ. U specijalistièkoj literaturi, teza o „srpskoj izuzetnosti“ razvijana je u razlièitim
formama, èijem kritièkom razmatranju je posveæen prvi deo rada. Identifikovano je
nekoliko paradigmi, u zavisnosti od toga da li osnovni naglasak stavljaju na: 1) tradi-
cionalistièku, autoritarnu i kolektivistièku politièku kulturu Srba, 2) afinitet izmeðu
tradicionalnog srpskog nacionalnog populizma, rusofilskog antizapadnjaštva i komu-
nizma, 3) ekskluzivistièku i asimilacionistièku prirodu srpskog nacionalizma, ili pak
4) odlike savremene srpske politièke elite na èelu sa S. Miloševiæem. U drugom delu
rada izlo eno je alternativno objašnjenje, èiji su glavni oslonci: 1) istorijsko nasleðe
(osobena priroda srpskog kolektivnog istorijskog iskustva i odnos izmeðu srpskog i
jugoslovenskog identiteta), 2) institucionalna analiza (neplanirane posledice komu-
nistièkog federalizma), 3) ideologija (o ivljavanje prièa o Srbima kao  rtvi meðu
srpskim intelektualcima), 4) osobine voða i društvena baza (osobeni karakter Miloše-
viæeve politièke poruke u razdoblju završne krize komunizma) i 5) uloga dijaspore
(do ivljaj etnièke pretnje meðu Srbima u Hrvatskoj i Bosni).
Kljuène reèi: Srbija, izuzetnost, objašnjenje, istorijsko nasleðe, politièka
kultura, tradicija, politièke elite.
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